Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6447113407e7229…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: ebd93490ebd757e241e4c57aec1fd826 SHA-1: 21287d22778c412b7cdc43b7c10ef99faf02dfdc SHA-256: f6447113407e7229303779e6688ab9e9c966b8bbb3e44253849345894683a23b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The \objupdate directive further suggests that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to arbitrary code execution. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the heuristics strongly indicate a classic exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000073.bin
0a9ca5fd8a8d683f3067fb119319fc3ada8fbd273d6a29cdcfa1bc30f68fb09a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x73 1973 bytes