Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f62c8ee238d9cdc2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.4 KB Created: 2021-03-10 10:25:09 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 1ff07edfe4137d71f458e98b7761ba97 SHA-1: 28e6e8c837214689c795a82b477818c528621f85 SHA-256: f62c8ee238d9cdc293374d25779d2cde8acabfdf961cfb4cf26fd60bada16853
226 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document contains a large number of external links pointing to various PDF files hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' suggests this PDF might be a precursor to a password-protected archive, a common method to bypass gateway security.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 7

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://maypoin.ru/award?keyword=abzurdah+libro+completo+pdf+online
    • https://verevivomilob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738769/1348874.pdf
    • https://viwoseloza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134861971/zebifewo.pdf
    • https://jabuvevakeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134685488/708736.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xulawajikigi/ja6MidH/music_notes_line_drawing.pdf
    • https://rojobasexadef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132711954/sopizovaxose_ronoxe.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rigepasemapa/giFgcjj/gerowajube.pdf
    • https://fekazivijiwawad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134687088/2e8b6d8867.pdf
    • https://fefedajukuda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070841/99d3c.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4425921/normal_5fce66a382e7e.pdf
    • https://linebabeta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135317009/gefobaxudadisel-majivubajuk-busisudi-rolerijud.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/girolivudafo/gdghiho/puxifojejusoz.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370267/normal_5fe91f082414c.pdf
    • https://rebageronamit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775484/xuduxamedo-vakidivug.pdf
    • https://junenewawaxi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407408/381497e7.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4497688/normal_604625d932d42.pdf
    • https://nojoxarojip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813855/0f91597f8b.pdf
    • https://tirasuvemesamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134672388/zovezon.pdf
    • https://jikujumek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135318263/jufipudej.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/944533ec-24a3-4fde-bc22-2d98edc2a50c/dotapadoxo.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dd75b3df-e2fb-44b5-8836-6ec53e807ee5/monanuxaviven.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1ddb53b1-c2d5-4bba-b2c5-a2b24525b733/gijepafureru.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b9cbe443-d4e9-46c9-bc57-3551bf73da33/vezotigog.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c42fc061-0829-4f27-ab76-efdd796bbea6/how_to_allow_flash_on_chrome_android.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011e28.bin
6dfd6fa7b4cc03097be91d437c230220abc37ce7814f9479c6d06cca2977baef		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11E28 5396 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00013060.bin
56634b5e3b58994584e538e27816293ce85b8d2472e32a5dc24d6b0c8bf4346d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13060 11704 bytes

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