Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f603c74a34ac88a7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.0 KB Created: 2021-09-14 10:08:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 57b4fad01450008ffc9e5b9b2f550fb2 SHA-1: afab36a54f0537aeef085f04195862e1ecf8faa7 SHA-256: f603c74a34ac88a7c72f9e58fa6b5cd843e990984be1b3f08d63e99f8fc2df49
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, with heuristics indicating a malformed exploit stream and a link farm pointing to compromised websites. The embedded URLs suggest a phishing or malware distribution attempt by redirecting users to potentially malicious content hosted on compromised WordPress sites and other domains. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself is indicative of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9846

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://huntic.ru/uplcv?utm_term=spyro+3+psx PDF link annotation
    • https://vietnamwelder.vn/uploads/news_file/bulufoxetavevutaxolun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vedepcuaem.com/luutru/files/34433776970.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pazarziraat.com/userfiles/file/pifenorajeranepowafesolu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://atrsara.ir/resource/files/27047726532.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dadrarad.ro/userfiles/file/xotewigisetuponuzekoti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ksmt.edu.np/assets/ckfinder/userfiles/files/65789364373.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.davidcosz.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/mokfeh0v4gs16jqp5npm47r83e/87274063422.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://logiccpacma.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/65542274721.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.jysunshine-hotel.com/up_files/file/tovigadisa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://icaalliance.org/filespath/files/20210911220158.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lpsa.cz/userfiles/file/litusolinegafamufi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kantoromega.pl/userfiles/file/wobolivunu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xlux.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pqsh97hbvboq3l6mm0i6jupaf2/72757347182.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tortsurprise.ru/upload/redactor/files/75843537843.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://digireg.at/upload/vosigodowamituvabexebexew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nebovsem.ru/app/webroot/files/files/73079041148.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rajatotogroup1.com/contents/files/66219490625.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.linkkorea.co.kr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613fceb38dddd---86309750621.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bistro-8.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c1311cbb21db47e4a7e4429e45a63e20/dunewigewafapaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://planningpvedh.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/donuxijisigedebikuzugeno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://quincy.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/48948687762.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kaplaitalia.it/userfiles/files/koberumapenurira.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jcpingie.be/public/files/kimafebilalusob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artepcb.com/upload/files/pomidanu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.chauffeur-prive-nice.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161333e45878d1---64173313952.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://peak-experience-japan.com/images/blog/file/30161124906.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d974.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD974 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f18b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF18B 10076 bytes
SHA-256: 436d697b7ba923d7efcae18919c4804546c15bcec74988e7183bc69ee665caa4
font_02_sfnt_off0001080f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1080F 18680 bytes
SHA-256: c3e3cab8fff53c708d9ba2353b7a9bc925657e35eab083057c2335063458b34b

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