Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f5f49e499f240cd2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

14.1 KB
MD5: 1e6a76f6e11a2c138633883c9bf0a6a7 SHA-1: 8a5e1a140841924faeb052e284bd6b61f36dc7f7 SHA-256: f5f49e499f240cd2b6286a62601e76f4ca036d20d1c513650b331acc710efd7d
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The PDF file contains heuristics indicating it is an XFA form with a stager designed to execute code. ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962' further confirms its malicious nature. The embedded URL, while seemingly benign, is associated with the XFA schema and could be part of the exploit chain. The primary attack vector appears to be exploiting PDF vulnerabilities, specifically within XFA forms, to deliver a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
  • XFA title base-26 eval stager high PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGER
    PDF XFA initialize script reads an encoded payload from the document title, builds event.target.eval and String.fromCharCode from string fragments, decodes base-26 character pairs, and evals the recovered stage. This is an exploit-kit staging pattern; the static bytes do not prove a specific CVE by themselves.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin
c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x2ACC 85 bytes
embedded_file_obj0042.bin
dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2B7E 1029 bytes
embedded_file_obj0043.bin
d7f7bd6434fff4670f50233bfe5cf596fac9d4d44d97771942e495ed6801d5e8
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2D97 1949 bytes
embedded_file_obj0044.bin
3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x321E 144 bytes
embedded_file_obj0045.bin
10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x32CA 77 bytes