Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f5cbbf5e3c179185…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.9 KB
MD5: 7b26100dbd765175ee7d9e2b0f0bd85e SHA-1: 76be6d871596a2d417f78d322f339f9a1242bc03 SHA-256: f5cbbf5e3c179185372b578cb4b1d8259c51b43c071f62b7c46a2a3d02cfa707
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the document is designed to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening. No second-stage payload or network indicators were directly observed in the static analysis.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000091.bin
40444bf8645f78e8a2366b4dd496499306a0cea1e1539958ce5d95adbad80775
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x91 1284 bytes