RTF malware analysis — malicious · f59637b1aceaee02

MALICIOUS

RTF

101.8 KB First seen: 2024-08-21

MD5: 7d9390f8ceb53bcf05fe13ad7c3f9c8f SHA-1: 07a4ad07a5732034a937719a08dde4264d6074b7 SHA-256: f59637b1aceaee02840f19c31bd5824d6f97703f547b7b3c437bb2ff022bce9f

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF file contains critical heuristic firings indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability through OLE objects. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate directives further suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely to execute a secondary payload. This points to a delivery mechanism leveraging a known exploit for initial access.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001d6b.bin` `5f49cdc3070ee89ee5e48570386248b5e14ebcd5c429d20c9674e46487aef588`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D6B	2008 bytes

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