Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f594bf8746027418…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: 4b2ea32ec6a8a29a93e43f550d0f6df0 SHA-1: 7347d97e4b364323529ea01709ec5ce7049e4d11 SHA-256: f594bf8746027418a82a15be485bc26d59fa2777294f54777c86c295a3cef23a
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections, along with the critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, strongly indicates an exploit attempt. This technique is commonly used to deliver a malicious payload, likely leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000c3.bin
ff0c5c3169b237b3caf1030b7db11894f82c6b40bb7c6b6fb23846bae6c833be
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC3 2066 bytes