Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f588740f3de4a6ba…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.29 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-09-27
MD5: cb7f11d1092737c0fba0b63c22fc72e2 SHA-1: d4902e276f6fe9014f6d3d863f10b0f958a60ea3 SHA-256: f588740f3de4a6bae5a1bca6c82e80d83c51c614a1a40e1b441fb33184cd8a0a
312 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, a known indicator for exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. This object likely serves as a dropper for a secondary PDF payload. The PDF itself contains a direct link to an executable payload hosted at https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com, indicating a multi-stage attack designed to download and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
e88a02abf6537b162832a2bb0f9e08354c8d2da0403347583a765243e40bc85a		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00338C23/OlE10nAtiVE 1616 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006f800.pdf
31d7dc4e61dd872788d23ed6a4cba3813cefe89121ac8ab1579fecdcbfa3eca7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6F800 892928 bytes
stream_004_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
d413eec6e4b90a9f4e4f5acca4b534020df14a649911b295d8841dc416fef7ba		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1345536 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
b29241dfd214f205c6e7ed380c26d3bfee50ba80f199131d88381a82e13004b1		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1323520 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029600.pdf
29307da7bf060d972c5bad271b603846e2d28680edcba701c9dd2bc94e3e6812		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29600 1180160 bytes

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