Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f5881d93695e0d3c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.7 KB Created: 2020-11-05 21:32:56 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: 6494e9bdd9dd5bbf839bb330a7776606 SHA-1: 06fcd4d3f61ae2146a3a17c62345819cd7f90bf8 SHA-256: f5881d93695e0d3c70ea359d44b5b6321a2cac639bf60cf59287609ee36b0fe1
126 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/aws?keyword=root+takahira+agreement+1908+apush PDF link annotation
    • https://vafuzetok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740798/begufirufajiruz_lanijevebop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://janazasifopuno.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134437996/1532355.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tumixivig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636813/4105253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawowigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130774982/2742576.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408184/normal_5f9fa85e0d2e5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dulexarupiwaju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133986428/silikof_magutuwufu_fofetojom_xutiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xibedawik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134584063/1511499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wodedofa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320626/6094721.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xogunepole.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134529021/tuboriwodomat-sutureguneraxad-lefalij-ronego.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wigegavevimuxak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134132972/8d8a99.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://keniwuki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483234/5acab582ad41.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4393035/normal_5f98e8271bba5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9616ce64-6b2c-496b-b5ca-dd231356c4cb/sunomelerovawuzeno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000061f7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x61F7 4232 bytes
SHA-256: eee6c60bd42a6eb81568ba5122ea3f4134c98bdb37121bd7d73bf279abc2e0d5
font_01_sfnt_off000070db.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x70DB 5696 bytes
SHA-256: 66345e1fa6379bed43b162c3e9529a95b1ff9d6c06266e4048f7545eff400ab4
font_02_sfnt_off0000841b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x841B 11348 bytes
SHA-256: cea0a6eed2e1a30d04807c9b7f296a304f6a923529d917cfd0ecf830b1734817
font_03_sfnt_off0000a877.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA877 16076 bytes
SHA-256: 9605e1d03be989d6031878619259f35ebdba74de05da97e2d7db08892469389f
font_04_sfnt_off0000bd20.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBD20 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3

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