Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f582f6e4ae2056bb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.0 KB Created: 2021-09-17 21:25:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: 4618b29f4e38aefe192117e7e842f630 SHA-1: 5021a7d3ad23697a475c5b44cd26967e544eb6ca SHA-256: f582f6e4ae2056bbb0566ee96d9c134410365c70aeba135e8ee1bd05674dccca
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It contains embedded JavaScript and numerous links, many pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of embedded JavaScript indicates potential for further malicious actions, such as downloading additional payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.nvsrolko.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/90692930007.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://hoachattn.com/image/files/37511263739.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://felixefontesadvogados.com.br/ckfinder/userfiles/files/takavofurepivapupozekaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abwbaltimore.com/uploads/files/tesidixuxebapo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dangkydoanhnghiep.org/hinhanh_fckeditor/file/wunowodefoli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://buren-kompanie.de/userfiles/files/larukanisofo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ipllaser.in/uploads/3625770128.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nabisori.com/userfiles/file/21982602607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.carlosfunes.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613f88f1077d7---13832911795.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yk-tech.com.tw/ckfinder/uploads/ckfiles/files/45210844676.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sharpeningfactory.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16144577b1af86---64184163095.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://inclinedigital.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612f7f2494784---pegumajoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kssi.ir/public/userfiles/file/komapuwudukuxuzal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://brihat-group.com/assets/userfiles/files/givogidigadov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://szamitogep-szerviz-javitas.hu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/89298993021.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zhuoxinlaw.com/userfiles/file/20210915161227_716951771.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://safarang.com/basefile/files/tabezarumatasesozakedup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yogo110.com/userfiles/file/zuzopobanuwenomokudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80adib9cjd8a5e.xn--p1ai/i/upload/files/17852711575.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stsmcc.org/www/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wemifosurejezidegikilod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hypnotiseur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16134a77caed89---51820995325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=android+pubg+mobile+litePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d747.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD747 18256 bytes
SHA-256: ad35f34534cb63abed51bdbd334c969894ac5b55f99696a020a9c7202543cf93
font_01_sfnt_off000106d6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x106D6 10628 bytes
SHA-256: f768a867e93d91dc069b94953532dcbe32154909ea5f0ead6ab0a89bfe1f5498
font_02_sfnt_off00011e9f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11E9F 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1