Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f52b020e86065767…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

6.5 KB
MD5: d7df8a029d7851e26d5ee9115af4b40e SHA-1: 549f56becc1a13209dc0f240e822794ab6b7592f SHA-256: f52b020e86065767d221b34d5aa8c0d794222336cd2c221ec13685e37a50de07
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run a second-stage payload. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000507.bin
1ba71551fb9cb2df17765054b94c2cfa75fc22e0158cc7a433c40d833f9aa64b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x507 1955 bytes