Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f50be36a20f08b1c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.6 KB First seen: 2021-05-04
MD5: 10f145af3641751cb55fea4cff64d88b SHA-1: 34ea95df0face567611ec967c0602edfa86aad49 SHA-256: f50be36a20f08b1c69e72039200d65e1fe459a35ec0c7ee01effead0a28a22bc
180 Risk Score

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000008a.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8A 2117 bytes
SHA-256: 5fea8ad89eaefd260bb8836bf3afc4ce056e312109167a8d1d924dfdd76e6053