Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f505019d8ee0b329…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

163.4 KB Created: 2020-04-04 07:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: f0ad720dbed7cfdc9c9c1c3a5cf9e93b SHA-1: 51875320c36930cb51043541452d2f8b2c697391 SHA-256: f505019d8ee0b32971149d20984223cbc5d23b196503d3db6b1dc4d0dc5719b3
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The critical heuristic firing indicates a Shell() call within the VBA code, suggesting the macro attempts to execute an external command. This is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload, although no specific URLs or commands were directly extracted from the provided evidence. The presence of a VBA auto-exec macro with execution terms further supports this conclusion.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b9f95170e29d2f9be1a96c47cc305864856ef90b9d18bc8abfcb9acd9ba42856		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2817 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
98c3a9f2d25cf6b297d3e312fa21a32bafc2da2681b407b58fad4cc9a8f9bfb2		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 12800 bytes

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