Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f4ef89006d3c5098…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.3 KB Created: 2021-07-10 02:48:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 502ed000fd3eb596db9c74432be50489 SHA-1: 5002ef7dfe841b17eba0a7352fc2b5861681257a SHA-256: f4ef89006d3c509821056b26973eeebddc7292031932a135e36bb54bc9f00d88
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous external links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of a 'download' button lure further supports a phishing or social engineering attack. ClamAV detection and ML classification confirm the malicious nature of the file, likely a phishing document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=openapi+multiple+examples
    • https://ceilford.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e9817fc09e40ba3ed1665b25413b2ab1/jaredevajogiponikepotifa.pdf
    • https://anukulagrotech.com/userfiles/file/losupitabibezewasolipi.pdf
    • http://on-video.com/movies/movie_data/file/56791038324.pdf
    • http://xperion.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1e6305581291de8035585e449a723557/94928954784.pdf
    • https://puertoestereo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/m1tj1i4argt4bbskpt0raqf8hp/17940136756.pdf
    • https://m-co.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/imisgrbcogm4gsi4qhgkcvjr4h/18641976479.pdf
    • http://training-solutions.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160726e85b8ef7---58021256611.pdf
    • http://ellerbeefamilyreunion.com/clients/874543/File/pikodipuferiwuxusatinad.pdf
    • http://drkoopman.nl/cmsimages/file/8887282861.pdf
    • https://www.adcgrain.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b807af0e8d5254d9e40233f2bce83a1d/24353880817.pdf
    • http://aimic.com/userfiles/file/26029297342.pdf
    • https://ringid.vn/ckfinder/userfiles/files/44697977741.pdf
    • http://cga82.com/admin/File/62149674964.pdf
    • http://hamdard.com/hamdard/app/webroot/img/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xalawogenaxunirevaravojuw.pdf
    • https://www.masismarketing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f9ad642c519da2dea05b101d07ed9673/soparipaxupiketak.pdf
    • http://perfectthesale.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bd141f64792---kadovosanot.pdf
    • http://makaeximworld.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b7c9e0c1e4---29958183114.pdf
    • https://eitmedu.in/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kepige.pdf
    • http://pericosrentcar.com.mx/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075575185651---gederimekumomer.pdf
    • https://bellevuecommunityfoodbank.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5cf6015c248b628ab73cfa4790c711ce/29461865043.pdf
    • https://mmszke.hu/files/file/67058679483.pdf
    • https://europeancustomtailor.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d905e6246eae3ebdead6d7e9f3f6f8e0/xenuduxabetofikominegoj.pdf
    • http://www.champcaregivers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160983c3f6bb81---25028894534.pdf
    • https://www.saenger-ohg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c91292e1fa---tebuvuwiv.pdf
    • https://happycustomerservice.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ca65d2284da0ceeceb6525490a958756/vakimujuvuze.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de13.bin
e11f7c0dad24ef86939fbf5ea4a537a1bab40837ed52c41040f4e2e2c2fd1627
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE13 17436 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010c10.bin
8a537003c0f5b43e940fd6dcaa915037dc443ddaf3a6c973b4258fe1c3314d96
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C10 10420 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000123be.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x123BE 16792 bytes