Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f4e808fbb0cdc781…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.6 KB Created: 2021-03-04 00:50:19 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 43a5269c139b44b3b1053d27e4a2cc42 SHA-1: 0fc92b4b0f78e1279253d141411ab461c0018f94 SHA-256: f4e808fbb0cdc7815758316373f58ff94090dc73b44db8ff0e28bde5192c66bd
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains and Weebly hosting, indicating a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV heuristic strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for SEO manipulation or to distribute further malware. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm behavior are indicative of malicious document distribution, often initiated via spearphishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://golowaki.ru/strik?utm_term=why+did+the+cow+keep+jumping+over+the+barrel+answer+key PDF link annotation
    • https://bajipupetezin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135315063/88313.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fevebelok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012800/1765956.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tobosuxonekid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134493818/8360d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://savineme.mywebcommunity.org/durejufarotatumo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dapurixid.sportsontheweb.net/phone_says_line_in_use_centurylink.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zatitudebijozi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134460539/gazitar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bunutawopuzo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134868528/ff0febd3d9f10.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://suwuriru.onlinewebshop.net/dd_beyond_spells_warlock.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dadupawo/fegulijimaxezuleravero.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sasukagisodubex.onlinewebshop.net/kopujomapoza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mukajuzata.rf.gd/namosobogiwezepam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vesubodufisi/rujila.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cd20.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCD20 6036 bytes
SHA-256: 0f64ec4e9ae43673461b1eba3f8909c4f6843929e36a9de5fbf475af23ca7076
font_01_sfnt_off0000e199.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE199 1996 bytes
SHA-256: c161700250722520d77267804a54043d9aeb03a6417870bc1f87c35a435b1c9d
font_02_sfnt_off0000eafe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAFE 11048 bytes
SHA-256: a680f4582d5cf0bb347ca4df6b027749afd89f00e4e307f51bfe99bd5c0f107f

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