Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f4ba39aecd14e99a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

50.7 KB Created: 2020-08-11 02:58:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 1a52ac6ba8f55fdea8604b95b116b5c5 SHA-1: 44dcebe5e813eea361b746c70c27b058c03fd286 SHA-256: f4ba39aecd14e99a1639d966c30be6e45bfdff4117ca6aa1b445d50e1e302edd
152 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains multiple external links, with one identified as a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the URL that leads to the redirector. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the PDF structure suggests a link farm designed to distribute malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=acid+rain+solutions+pdf
    • http://romanof.2dovesdesignz.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814930/majufubu.pdf
    • http://vosifi.biggleswadesquash.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814930/perobu-vovunaxit.pdf
    • http://files.halexc.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814245/luxobo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8252/2528/files/tasekiwulekerenujurewopes.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1892/7776/files/92918064555.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6945/7063/files/mavepotebasutelitop.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9699/8041/files/how_to_cite_a_document_found_online.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5226/9717/files/nimexobevubagululitofix.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1403/7409/files/51214838441.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0591/9903/files/aamc_sample_test_conversion.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9376/9894/files/72374101074.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0445/3544/7711/files/bihar_iti_answer_key_2020.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8570/1019/files/kizizujufifazezaxek.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008802.bin
635a7d3375cda0cf7eaff4c5c7a0fd71e4ffbfe3460614f6302c74719247747b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8802 5140 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000997f.bin
45e5c77819e384e989217c30bda905bdf3bdbad3c91796ec06e4fd63c84474b0
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x997F 10624 bytes