Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f4b770344e787911…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

152.6 KB Created: 2020-09-14 20:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 9b98dfc94c1cc317de7526b0a2ff2074 SHA-1: 89696d3f7ee77144f4a2175bc06659745e9e52bf SHA-256: f4b770344e78791146677dc8e1fa4d56fcb574605948de9381aeaab6a0b9bf74
300 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening the document. This macro utilizes a hidden UserForm to launch an obfuscated PowerShell stager. The PowerShell command, reconstructed from concatenated strings, appears to be 'powershell -e JABSADMAbABmA2vhaghsghfF8AZgAyAD0AKA2vhaghsghfAoACcASgA5ADE2vhaghsghfAeAB5ACcAKwAn2vhaghsghfAGwAJwApACsAJ2vhaghsghfwA0ACcAKQA7AC2vhaghsghfYAKAAnAG4AZQA2vhaghsghf', which is designed to decode and execute a second-stage payload. This behavior, along with the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762672-0', strongly indicates the Emotet family.

Heuristics 8

  • Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL
    OLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762672-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762672-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c7305ccc26d392bb87c692b42d2d6bc38b982a0e4da883514cef9164df30503f
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 18576 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.