Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f48727e4bed76fbb…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

500.8 KB
MD5: 424471c08b36379794b6883c023da1a9 SHA-1: 4b0b270c08248b7625c3c39c65398782cfc138f6 SHA-256: f48727e4bed76fbba8aed9036c36e0f82641cd6b0f72bb53e8004a10b71141bb
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with high-confidence heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms the document attempts to trick the user into enabling macros or editing, a common delivery mechanism for malicious payloads. No scripts were extracted, and no specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
630e003193962770ad4596159029cf9fd81bc0b466e0996c7cbff67256d56d74
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 154315 bytes
objdata_01_off0004efd8.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4EFD8 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0005057b.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5057B 12297 bytes