MALICIOUS
220
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
The sample was identified as a legacy WordBasic macro-virus by heuristics, specifically noting the presence of markers like 'TOOLSMACRO'. Further analysis revealed anomalies in the OLE structure, including empty streams and a large unaccounted-for region, indicating deliberate obfuscation or corruption. ClamAV also detected it as Win.Trojan.Eraser-13, reinforcing its malicious nature.
Heuristics 5
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ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Eraser-13 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Eraser-13
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Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGEA CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
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Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUSOLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 16,818 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 16,818 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMSThe file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
embedded_office_off00003a4e.ole |
embedded-office | Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x3A4E | 16818 bytes |
SHA-256: 07b6baa920bfe1a02f8271131979a50af14a52275cae5a6c4fdd59524c8e34f4 |
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embedded_office_off0000514e.ole |
embedded-office | Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x514E | 10930 bytes |
SHA-256: fbc8c45710ba566f003ae2ecb461c4ec49150a13ad4104135b9b74381ea36971 |
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