Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f43566ef6a2f7bab…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.63 MB
MD5: defe6b80c1e2f41005efe5cb017d438c SHA-1: 28dc66de536b04f1fa3d31b060ff0c8e3baef3db SHA-256: f43566ef6a2f7babd6648cc975eee8cf72c0c055657df85f527cca29c682aca9
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an encrypted OOXML document, a common carrier for exploits. The presence of an Equation Editor OLE object strongly suggests it's designed to exploit a vulnerability within that component. The encryption with a default password further indicates a deliberate attempt to conceal malicious content. No specific family is identifiable from the provided heuristics.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.