Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f42c2eac11a1f6e1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.0 KB
MD5: a6cd0d4aa6e5a8b84008f9e3a95cc08a SHA-1: 74d2cf43312108de096281c3277c70b9dc82237a SHA-256: f42c2eac11a1f6e1821c4720ab32ecbeb5fcb97eceecd936736fae9774bc3d50
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution

This PDF document exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms. The heuristic firings indicate that the PDF contains an embedded script payload within an XFA form, which is designed to trigger the exploit. The embedded file is likely the second-stage payload. The exploit allows for arbitrary code execution, enabling further malicious actions.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
690a222d86a4fcb7ea39947168c4413c2666f86b5dd69c96a076c38f28fb61aa
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 80113 bytes