Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f41a22ee2a9d1e1a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.2 KB Created: 2020-06-07 20:06:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4e2e0a98a561e4ee10b94c8495673f78 SHA-1: 4325c0cd2ebe074a70ae08689a70d6abcc600d0b SHA-256: f41a22ee2a9d1e1aa3edb080ac440356ccfb17ba3842518b2ae29a89f340f0f6
62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a significant number of external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic. These links point to various domains, suggesting a link farm or distribution network. The embedded document body text, though partially corrupted, contains references to 'wkhtmltopdf' and 'creation_date', indicating it was likely generated programmatically. The primary intent appears to be directing users to a large collection of external PDF documents, potentially for SEO manipulation or to serve as a distribution point for further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://duettogroup.net/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856161/131856161.html#nicel+ara%25C5%259Ft%25C4%25B1rma+y%25C3%25B6ntemleri+%25C3%25B6zellikle
    • http://mybrotherskeeperministries.org/uploads/1/3/0/5/130550976/mipujitiko.pdf
    • http://escaperoomsatthemill.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621359/a1be2f449f3505.pdf
    • http://eblanchard.net/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380730/e03ef4f00c.pdf
    • http://vestigegraphics.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130289789/7873879.pdf
    • http://1k2.undesirable.us/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398564/lagobepukuzuxukama.pdf
    • http://kevinmentzer.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775196/jelosezu-kipimafidozowu-kagapimepokome.pdf
    • http://lifestylerealtyandconsulting.net/uploads/1/3/0/5/130550774/sonalepupel.pdf
    • http://mta-sts.mx.bayardguitars.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871424/1874747.pdf
    • https://woniwefis.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/rawiz.pdf
    • https://fufejuf.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tagipude.pdf
    • https://kiwekesumi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/46472042314.pdf
    • https://zejawoxo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/66518734735.pdf
    • https://powutaxu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nelovag.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00009d67.bin
21f589e057813c67d90c7591c3228bf6e7b8420b31fd5de24a86a9fbcde55ed2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9D67 12492 bytes

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