Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f4123af740d12f4a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

388.8 KB
MD5: 8ab7ba1f085207e85161b23a0f6333b1 SHA-1: fb42aa1665199b1a8746dc654baf5109779a7e96 SHA-256: f4123af740d12f4a112e99fedd38d457144cc4e067b3bcb1b6f4755861f29bc5
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains an altChunk that imports an RTF file. This RTF file, in turn, contains an OLE object that is configured to auto-update and execute an embedded PE (executable) file. This technique is commonly used to deliver second-stage malware. The presence of RTF_MZ_HEX and RTF_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PE heuristics strongly indicates this malicious behavior.

Heuristics 9

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    (in altChunk RTF word/Bhutan.rtf) RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Bhutan.rtf) Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • altChunk RTF auto-updates embedded executable object critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PE
    OOXML document imports an embedded RTF through altChunk; the RTF contains OLE object data, forces object update, and carries a hex-encoded PE payload. This is a stronger compound exploit-loader shape than a generic altChunk RTF wrapper, but it is not tied to a single CVE unless the nested RTF object primitive also matches one.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Bhutan.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Bhutan.rtf) RTF contains ~1344KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Bhutan.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Bhutan.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
5d30f73bdd85c55c8c47ffbcb5626bebdaaa29ba7b6a6da9274dedea92535a7d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 685290 bytes
objdata_01_off0015dc18.bin
31e3bdb4635082b6f5401bd7688a1baf90019932fe37de5dee9246f0964b7ef4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15DC18 584266 bytes