Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f3fa25e99f89bb2f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.0 KB Created: 2021-07-03 12:55:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 7e968df239ffa58a7c7a2edac8bf8ef1 SHA-1: 90facba1775ece57acefae2a2c6b0373b2986eed SHA-256: f3fa25e99f89bb2f810178385a8764b93e646f68b15ec52be38370e48e705ccf
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including links to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting it is part of a phishing campaign. The heuristic 'SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE' indicates the document likely attempts to trick the user into installing remote support tools, a common pretext for malware delivery. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection further confirm its malicious nature, pointing towards a phishing or trojan payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9948

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://richmediahouse.com/admin/uploads/file/saxilumowi.pdf
    • https://dolmalatrek.com/userfiles/file/nomaveromevejatezuxox.pdf
    • http://www.barankayalar.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609ee176f41dd---buleveliv.pdf
    • http://expertsystemgroup.com/file_media/file_image/file/36011216844.pdf
    • https://ilc.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4d76vb3nj9o6l525157pgc6pt7/lidowagixolewide.pdf
    • http://www.lifestaralberta.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c1c6e54d734---nejasemelarepebum.pdf
    • http://roxtechsignalling.com/userfiles/files/93652977005.pdf
    • http://cooper1972.com/clients/b/b4/b451ebb09e7e0345645526f893d9a49e/File/78775713817.pdf
    • http://straub-online.ch/userfiles/files/fokopuviruvod.pdf
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/964atjqfg5bd1q51su4ramguf5/vamid.pdf
    • https://cutletsmeat.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c363aa677b8---bewerixugivebuxalu.pdf
    • http://arci-mp.fr/admin/File/zeniritaxefigokujixoz.pdf
    • http://kstarsmall.net/userfiles/file///14842831956.pdf
    • http://hugslock.com/app/webroot/img/files/31519550615.pdf
    • http://rund.cz/UserFiles/File/7236337212.pdf
    • https://locoffice.ru/userfiles/file/24098494871.pdf
    • http://anhuicrew.com/upload_fck/file/2021-5-6/20210506220205280518.pdf
    • http://www.uppld.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ac127cdd99---mojunazopimorunilovif.pdf
    • https://terravistahometeam.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b8f8b645f7de36199df02a5fea1de31d/51202455246.pdf
    • https://aduanaldelvalle.com/userfiles/file/18093181782.pdf
    • http://www.redactordecontenidos.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aabdef1e6f4---nemizopulididimitukonul.pdf
    • http://thegioidahoacuong.com/uploads/image/files/13884363666.pdf
    • http://iideree.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a7884adec1---satewizesewi.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=how+can+you+get+a+stye
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f267.bin
741ed7455e71b4e7f3691dfdb521f56fa3ac996a20bb028081afd34c304ae7bc
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF267 17048 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011efa.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11EFA 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013711.bin
f415c7e5b408284d3f337feb1c762c0336442cc15ee278d943ae5a6eea778e05
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13711 10460 bytes