Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f395b9d7aee2a2b6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.34 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: c0ce5fe0bf5304df10b776472d8c7255 SHA-1: 3bf5c40e3daba17bdc3205a93cc2dc8b3951cebd SHA-256: f395b9d7aee2a2b64be774d9a3b2978a5d2762d8ff8b899a35ee96f86ccddb79
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 heuristics indicate exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded OLE object is activated, as suggested by the RTF_OBJUPDATE firing. The specific exploit targeted is CVE-2017-8759.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0023ffa7.bin
6824df0b64c55d92200f7e3771cd4b1ab5c5e5fe59d510d7b6578f58cee6ee68
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x23FFA7 3732 bytes