Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f3895d05223780da…

MALICIOUS

RTF

107.5 KB Created: 2020-01-16 14:02:00 First seen: 2020-06-01
MD5: d5b569ecee78464a57c2445506225025 SHA-1: 0848a91efb756c21ed42142648867070e19a4ff7 SHA-256: f3895d05223780dad9f8e50c6022a1d0b4c1791ab50913c675e574f89f3d015d
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and triggers critical heuristics for CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation for client execution. The embedded URL suggests a download of a second-stage payload, likely delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://fitgime.com/csi/bin_c0c9.msi In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000089bf.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x89BF 15672 bytes
SHA-256: efddc9ed8b1f5b26f7801fed5be6df8e665b791f6a86158c0445ae00ed261c39

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