Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f35eac16ffd4ad68…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

33.9 KB First seen: 2023-06-20
MD5: 12a5f2c315411e7dc7d0120c4a63c0a7 SHA-1: 082df366068f99d9840a0587315660384107ac85 SHA-256: f35eac16ffd4ad6864764a6eea0b8108615aca7d0695f0a6d312a8c739ca4a99
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to trigger the exploit. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to enable editing, a common tactic for malware droppers. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload, though no specific script or URL was directly extracted.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005c53.bin
7d59a95adf071fd7e2bc19853d7090ed6842b4be03d5ac19510655def98b60a0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5C53 1713 bytes