Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f34f606899e595d2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.9 KB Created: 2021-09-23 21:35:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: b119661a9929ae964804f6423c0693cd SHA-1: c5ff12120b0226977e763607f765284162560144 SHA-256: f34f606899e595d2d1bcf6e88f0cba361a74e01fcf7d96fcd44029534b6ba276
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs and is flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, specifically as a phishing trojan. Heuristics indicate it functions as a link farm, directing users to potentially compromised or disposable hosting sites. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with phishing lures designed to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://philabc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=ocr+pdf+android
    • https://terracetemayonetim.com/upload/ckfinder/files/xozusopigazad.pdf
    • http://www.shipsupply.co.mz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613ab2b00b6b1---loloma.pdf
    • http://www.mab-solutions.fr/upload/file/74507685156.pdf
    • https://szekszardportal.hu/userfiles/file/76456016507.pdf
    • https://profitaler.com/UserFiles/file/ximibeguzuburukemabadez.pdf
    • https://diversifiedhumansolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f228bf8a341a6e201a0b6bc1c8d7285d/12084074580.pdf
    • https://egyseg.eu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/puvabika.pdf
    • https://tyeetomsfishing.com/userfiles/file/kawivibarinovum.pdf
    • http://buyo-g.net/userfiles/file/55627970648.pdf
    • https://goez3.com/10005001208290177/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kixofo.pdf
    • http://www.frank-diagn.hu/userfiles/files/venosoxopa.pdf
    • http://discoveryenglish.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161381734cc128---55481584369.pdf
    • http://gowowdeli.com/uploads/files/rodajugabogoxozugafi.pdf
    • https://newtech-utm.pl/userfiles/file/bexowapiwizalozaduvotaj.pdf
    • https://optimumquestsolutions.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/madibixu.pdf
    • http://sh-ruiyangcpa.com/userfiles/file/2021-9///2021961420376176.pdf
    • https://ises.ca/phpsites/vertical_living/uploads/file/veberupuzi.pdf
    • http://lavera.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613be06d301cb---4565464372.pdf
    • https://membermimpi.com/contents/files/muzelikelunimaxuxo.pdf
    • https://portalbime.com/UploadedFiles/New/file/dexixunow.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e106.bin
23512e576b0a49d88252a38b9a47a5c6022c1b477f806e72484228726bb65b8f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE106 10196 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f7e8.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7E8 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00010ffa.bin
963ee22974ab8fe147f8df7c4ee67819561a6a13c471c077536ecbee06a0eb05
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10FFA 18000 bytes