RTF malware analysis — malicious · f34155575606c4bb

MALICIOUS

RTF

85.0 KB First seen: 2024-08-16

MD5: d18067e4be9ca434241869dda26c5f8f SHA-1: e3f3abcc32c87d48037d68577c3b625bb1c02636 SHA-256: f34155575606c4bb730c370e184b5581e724c35fa0161da93f37e5263d476650

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of \objdata, \objupdate, and an automatically linked OLE object strongly suggests exploitation of Equation Editor to embed and activate malicious content. This typically leads to the download and execution of a secondary payload, hence the high confidence in this attack pattern.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000179a.bin` `ac254d482992c63ee0b5714b399ed22b29cb43920781850ce52ebb95ffad6461`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x179A	1731 bytes

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