Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f3218296ef03597e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.7 KB Created: 2021-01-20 06:07:34 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 94b2e18a3d2dd4f33dc25678f405b64c SHA-1: cddca510949d413ec32660a1e3504c12cdc724ed SHA-256: f3218296ef03597ecf3bfe5360967467559918253a58751ecfef3f34d09ba9d8
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links that redirect to a known malicious infrastructure, as indicated by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM heuristic further suggests this is part of a link farm on disposable hosting, likely intended to host phishing content or distribute malware. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/123?utm_term=the+humanities+culture+continuity+and+change+volume+1+4th+edition In PDF document text
    • https://site-1166732.mozfiles.com/files/1166732/purulia_baul_song.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://digozulujatozuj.iblogger.org/fostering_faith_catechist_formation_insert.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://donuliwobem.iblogger.org/git_install_windows_10_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lesagotefawa.22web.org/c._d_full_form_in_english.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372673/normal_5fd3c2820db7c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4464710/normal_5fabc709bc6dd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kululojilo/nicq2jg/mobilevoip_cheap_international_calls.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1172155.mozfiles.com/files/1172155/mejowafarawisavip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wudawagirus/qjbidRd/76630892452.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1166067.mozfiles.com/files/1166067/sip_cancellation_form_birla_mutual_fund.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mozedijiz/62257385331.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lezopobigeza/90401476658.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dowavelaxam/anti_ragging_act_ppt.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mekigutesazi.epizy.com/rurovijadofeweredurejab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pazifetanegapu/1_goal_free_education_for_all.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suzitivasekoga/smashy_road_apk_hacked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://puzexexaniledow.epizy.com/xatajokenaro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fcdb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCDB 5604 bytes
SHA-256: e4a249bf9e93df7e310c200066112f07dbfac9dc26c4aa1d4981e234e211e986
font_01_sfnt_off00010fcd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10FCD 11100 bytes
SHA-256: 2a477f986209b948f94e01f31a0a44626224a347b152950ee57089505438626f

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.