Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f31cb1b543727059…

MALICIOUS

RTF

229.9 KB Created: 2021-02-12 04:30:00
MD5: 6070a322da562b29788f47af8da96b78 SHA-1: cc47fba047f6924f846a9c7b0bcb1257ea30a735 SHA-256: f31cb1b543727059bdc5753641e1bb99fee5897031043f80460828dde39c1954
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The document body itself appears to be a benign list of schools, suggesting the exploit is the primary malicious function.

Heuristics 7

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2018_0802-6825822-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2018_0802-6825822-0
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000106.bin
429939a8ddde6753e0285f948773e3dd880c8cdbf5a72ff720b3366cb65c62e2		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x106 3628 bytes

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