Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f3109ce6288065dd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

3.44 MB Created: 2021-03-15 12:26:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: aef6919de68136f45346f2f24d734936 SHA-1: bec42be284e00232e6263c71fdf1e205a001f91d SHA-256: f3109ce6288065dd994041e1b6d350e67f0ac913ee6607592315715f2188b6b5
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a DOCM file containing VBA macros. Critical heuristics indicate the presence of a Document_Open macro that utilizes Shell() and CreateObject() calls, referencing cmd.exe. This strongly suggests the macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified, but the delivery mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.micros
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4e4bcd6e2f0538d897bbf80883a9b0c8b008a8693cb48296742fcffc6bd28ac8		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 8388608 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
bfa217cf17848bb3978c88055e642c7a8681a4dc7bfabcb27bd5a47bc4213706		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 3882496 bytes

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