Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f2d4c9f1e6b90335…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

23.9 KB First seen: 2022-11-16
MD5: b8e0e1d34a6b1428f4c7dd84f979e099 SHA-1: 3fab1af58ffbbb56b0b5177f935545a9b7ae4245 SHA-256: f2d4c9f1e6b90335996df8c3b3afc1f0dc16f6f0b0e025ba68719753a7a179ad
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains an OLE object with an embedded Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit vector. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view its content. This combination strongly suggests an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability via user interaction to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000410a.bin
53a00415dcd362a18ab6c65ee9a9f921cd6593f20fa9c2a111f4175f1ed60df8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x410A 1754 bytes