Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f2cb2416396b607a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

81.6 KB First seen: 2024-10-10
MD5: 8322a53bfb390ccd2ccc9462590ff274 SHA-1: ee2b1bb078f67587cfbf00a13a34ef106ea4d29d SHA-256: f2cb2416396b607a65a418532d94a106aa43780adc6809cc46e1c0e4306e04b2
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities and automatic OLE object activation. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to execute arbitrary code. The embedded OLE object data is the primary mechanism for delivering the exploit, leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001416.bin
15959281b1d8a7c781d5e03b16ec3a8b41c612a5208bafc6ddc7d1faf0fdcc38
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1416 1710 bytes