Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f2b6bd730547086c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.6 KB Created: 2021-02-17 17:42:44 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-25
MD5: e508c18192e47e9335e56c449fc3845b SHA-1: d8b20434d5b7c3ec7062d01b521c72d1e3cb862b SHA-256: f2b6bd730547086c7482fe9f50a74c1d845743653ced2cbbdf4e68ed146c528d
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wix?keyword=veeam+o365+installation+guide In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4447888/normal_60285a79c5913.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gemajesubon.22web.org/merge_data_from_two_excel_sheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4449599/normal_5fd2968c3d462.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4470837/normal_601667ec8e477.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lufusozajufa.22web.org/46101397807.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://buderenedisam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135302361/bikikeku-lumelazigewil-gisugaverulumo-juwonelige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://povuputuk.epizy.com/demabeforesolelare.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pisedij/rational_inequalities_examples_and_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/laginekux/circuit_wizard_crack.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jefevuxivux.epizy.com/mekupobega.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ziwutaje.epizy.com/nezatitita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xuvufajozurez.rf.gd/leading_change_book_report.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://naxamuj.epizy.com/breath_of_fire_4_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cdb3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCDB3 5456 bytes
SHA-256: 04fb07700273dd87d8e6b9f7a8f9350479f2be8d76e835886c8e85ee962f47f9
font_01_sfnt_off0000e034.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE034 12848 bytes
SHA-256: a0ba1ae9d2735c2ce02b96df7caf49f1a7da644afd790ac06e6685260f00fc34