Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f2a973a39b830d32…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

444.7 KB Created: 2018-10-24 03:12:08 Authoring application: Windows Installer XML (3.5.0626.0)
MD5: a29a29c542b44c44f08db0a286dcedcc SHA-1: dcff8878109b7d3353a5b4d9913079107ab612bb SHA-256: f2a973a39b830d327c915e9a194de5cd62c1571556959787637f4050bf169c9f
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The OLE document exhibits characteristics of a dropper, with a large slack space and an appended executable payload. Although VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of an embedded payload strongly suggests a malicious intent to deliver a secondary stage. The file's SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 455,371 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,321 bytes — 424,050 bytes (93%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://microsoft.com0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0a
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0
    • http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=91955ARPNOREPAIRARPNOMODIFYemptyfalseJoltVersionSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Silverlight[FullVersion
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@

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