Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f2a21636a06164ea…

MALICIOUS

RTF

107.4 KB Created: 2020-01-16 14:02:00 First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 936cd485b355232ef355c81cd8a7d319 SHA-1: 50979199a8cf3637beaddfab6bad516ff4c05bed SHA-256: f2a21636a06164ea6f59c285978b8eb2ead6a1cd927dc3450b281acf25a21462
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and triggers critical heuristics for CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor FONT record overflow) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation). These vulnerabilities allow for exploitation for client execution. The embedded URL 'http://fitgime.com/csi/bin_c2ec.msi' likely serves as a secondary payload, suggesting a spearphishing attachment delivery method.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://fitgime.com/csi/bin_c2ec.msi In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000089be.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x89BE 15672 bytes
SHA-256: 32f0943375122b96911d02b80468c9ca349142df8fcf723150bd0ede64cd5403

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