Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f290f25889ed1f42…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.7 KB
MD5: 35582d6c859d957758d5e9847f53e4db SHA-1: 5c5cd9b54b134b5840185b8e1e12ef56048c5a2c SHA-256: f290f25889ed1f421dc75d4a08ccfa6ce4bed925cb92ae6b0d45fbae0da71d4a
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, as indicated by the RTF_OBJDATA heuristic. The RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics suggest that these OLE objects are designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document. This mechanism is commonly used to deliver and execute malicious payloads, such as second-stage malware. No specific family could be identified, and the document body was heavily obfuscated.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000018cf.bin
d4a9aaf9ce759b279a2f0874b2caa7032d4493077785ac3665dd307a160083f9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x18CF 1798 bytes