Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f28a5799a09b0c08…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

1.30 MB Created: 2021-06-23 12:52:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: d1faac2c31205b310f8d189f12716a99 SHA-1: 74dec0c267e39b48b3832fd8f47a729e7396a41c SHA-256: f28a5799a09b0c08a171c850e770d0ad4d81b5b70ed589ddea12a7c616405301
662 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that executes a second-stage payload. The macro uses ShellExecuteA to run an embedded DLL, 'kikus.dll', which is likely dropped in the user's template path. The presence of an embedded PE executable and ClamAV detections for 'Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1' and 'Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0' further confirm its malicious nature. The script's intent is to download and execute a malicious DLL.

Heuristics 17

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b63fa2303f27e014e38c8c1471933c1dbb661e0d8d57af7ef2b73e4c07a34a03
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2719 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
embedded_office_0008fa71.exe
59c32d32329ae6cdb0251f5122c53cd740230af44ce5a8f4a98e2a210158bfb4
embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8FA71 778127 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
5679d57a2819a8a70bc4fa55ad1f169c306b9a0574a142f03b8ea8dbbee78075
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1685932986/Ole10Native 738613 bytes