EquationEditorExploitationFamily — RTF / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f2722185144e316d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.8 KB
MD5: aa212c0f86f8bbb259d2f9d00ba6801a SHA-1: 46c04c9a7a8c74a2c3be05c49e94150fc1cb679f SHA-256: f2722185144e316d55f4bd76aafc3d43ad9b67d714a08a2f174c93a93487c98b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

EquationEditorExploitationFamily · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 .NET/Nim/Other Language Interpreters T1204 User Execution

The presence of multiple indicators related to exploitation ofMicrosoft Equation editor within this RTF file strongly suggests its involvementin attacks leveraging these known CVEs.Critical heuristics specifically flaggedthe manipulation of Equation Editor'sProgIDs alongside suspiciousOLEobject handling behaviors which alignwith established patterns observed across pastexfiltration campaigns involving similar vectors.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003d.bin
cd43149584e51aeed45b3acd4fb27ef63bf145571094101406a3900ca8522463
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3D 1375 bytes