Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f26774b662b1be0d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

535.8 KB
MD5: 65ae4adec46a22a60d21492a4c1f14e7 SHA-1: caf6785182296a396a2615edcccc2a0e203bcf09 SHA-256: f26774b662b1be0d1f1518a5baffe91a837c29cb44582e894ae996aba952c39d
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object vulnerabilities or execute embedded code upon opening, likely to deliver a secondary payload. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document attempts to trick the user into enabling macros or content.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
a33588cc3e1bbe45249ced9211dd7d2e4c88975a9a19c752d5b46ed379b344fd		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 171546 bytes
objdata_01_off00057bda.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57BDA 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0005917d.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5917D 12297 bytes

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