Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f2615e71b3163126…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: ed2cb7b64281d2def1ce2b0cb8c1c968 SHA-1: c9cf421e018bf9101bf6c02fc5d7d1923a48ab42 SHA-256: f2615e71b31631261c0b7363c84582a0d3c01d9f68892708940f8574a061d4af
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening, leading to code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000093.bin
fc71cf28a6cf9233b5aaedaf5bc164b73872c6d755f1287f439f1d5f869a5761
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x93 1694 bytes